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ABSTRACT
What is the appropriate way of theorising about corporate bankruptcy law? That lies, argues this
paper, in rejecting Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in favour of a particular conception of
transaction cost efficiency, and in rejecting the ‘contractarian’ Creditors’ Bargain Model in
favour of the ‘contractualist’ Authentic Consent Model. The paper vindicates these arguments
with an analysis of the automatic stay which characterises the collective liquidation regime, of the
pari passu principle often said to be at the heart of this regime, and of the liability imposed in
some jurisdictions on the managers of terminally distressed companies for failing to take
reasonable steps to avoid further loss to their company’s creditors.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent book,1 I argued that corporate insolvency law is most fruitfully analysed as that
internally consistent set of principles which, both, fits and justifies most current legal texts and
practices (together, ‘legal practices’) regulating what I called peculiar insolvency issues. These
are issues uniquely associated with the situation in which an insolvent debtor is rendered unable
to meets its obligations as they become due. Principles fit legal practices if and to the extent to
which they cohere (in particular) with the letter and spirit of relevant statutes and with the
reasoning and conclusions of relevant courts. And they justify these practices if and to the extent
to which they show, both, that all the participants in those practices are treated as moral equals,
and that the practices are structured so as to minimise the waste of social resources.2 In testing
whether a particular principle respected the moral equality of all those subject to it, I employed
the heuristic of asking whether each of them would be unable reasonably to reject its application
to them in circumstances where none of them was aware of their personal circumstances, nor
even of their own identity.3 And I argued in favour of a particular version of transaction cost
efficiency as an appropriate means for investigating whether principles are wasteful. I labelled
this methodology the Authentic Consent Model (‘ACM’). The book employed the ACM to
analyse some of the fundamental features of (English) insolvency law, including the moratorium
on the enforcement of certain claims against insolvent companies (‘the automatic stay’), the pari
passu principle,4 the priority accorded by insolvency law to claims enjoying ‘fixed’ security, the
nature of ‘floating’ security and of receivership, the new UK administration procedure, the
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wrongful trading provisions,5 and certain provisions for the adjustment or reversal of preinsolvency transactions.
An interesting and thought-provoking review by Anthony Duggan6 provides an
opportunity to revisit some of the book’s central arguments. Duggan generously manages to find
value in my work.7 He also, however, takes it to task, in particular, for claiming to have
“reject[ed]” the Law and Economics methodology8 while nevertheless adhering to it “to a T”;9
and for claiming to be different from the well-known Creditors’ Bargain Model (‘CBM’) but in
fact “eliding” this model with the ACM.10 Drawing on these two themes, Duggan offers
illuminating comments on my treatment of the automatic stay, the pari passu principle, the
priority enjoyed under insolvency law by (fixed) secured credit, and the wrongful trading
provisions. Perhaps his clearest substantive disagreements with me are as to whether the CBM
can account for the automatic stay and for the wrongful trading provisions,11 and as to whether
the ACM can reconcile the self-interest of relevant parties with that model’s stipulation that each
party comply with the requirements of what I called reciprocity.12 I consider these disagreements
below. Virtually all of his other criticisms, as I read them, are directed not so much to the
substance of or conclusions to my analysis13 but to the two methodological claims Duggan
attributes to me, as highlighted above.14
It seems to me that Duggan is in many respects an ideal interlocutor. His commentary is
greatly challenging, and forced me to rethink several key aspects of my work. Upon reflection,
however, it turns out that almost all of his criticism is based on premises and propositions that I
have quite explicitly considered, and rejected. Surprisingly, Duggan hardly ever engages with, let
alone rebuts, the reasons I provide for such rejections. It follows that responding to him requires
me to restate – and in some instances, develop – certain of my positions. These restatements are
thus a convenient way of highlighting certain aspects of my approach to the analysis of corporate
insolvency law which might be of some interest to a general corporate and commercial law
audience. They also, I will argue, rebut Duggan’s criticism.
II. LAW, ECONOMICS, AND EFFICIENCY
My work draws heavily on efficiency analysis.15 The conception of efficiency at play here is not,
however, either of the ones common in much Law and Economics literature. In order to
understand this point, a distinction must be drawn between what I call the substantive and the
procedural goals of any part of the law.
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A. Substantive and Procedural Goals
Substantive goals are those the pursuit by some part of the law of which confers ultimate
justification on that branch of law by showing it in its best light, by demonstrating why it is
valuable to have that body of doctrine and practice at all. ‘To enable co-operation as moral equals
amongst all those affected by peculiar insolvency issues’ is an abstract statement of what I claim
is the main substantive goal of insolvency law. It would be a compelling justification for the
existence of this part of the legal domain, I have argued, that its absence would cause or lead to
the violation of the right to equal concern and respect inherent in all those who come to face
peculiar insolvency issues. Further and along parallel lines, certain fundamental principles of this
law are justified to the extent to which they promote the moral equality of all those to whom they
apply, and must be condemned to the extent that they detract from that equality. Procedural goals,
by contrast, are ideals of the manner in which laws are implemented so as to attain substantive
goals. To the extent to which social resources are scarce (and virtually all are), it is and must be a
central procedural goal of any part of the legal system that it goes about implementing its
substantive goals in the least wasteful manner practicable, since that would implement these
substantive goals to the maximal degree.
I reject the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks versions of efficiency employed in most Law
and Economics literature, on the basis that, inter alia, each purports to be, but is incapable of
being, a substantive goal of the law.16
B. The Untenability of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Analyses
A transaction is Pareto-efficient if its occurrence satisfies the preferences of at least one person
and does not cause a violation of the preferences of anyone else. Imagine the transfer of a
resource X from person A, who has a preference for retaining X which he values at £5, to person
B, who has a preference for obtaining X he values at £10. The transfer is Pareto efficient if B in
fact fully compensates A for the loss of X and is nevertheless better off, and if no one else is
made worse off because of the transfer. It is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if (as is the case in our
example) B could fully compensate A for the loss of X, and could also fully compensate anyone
else made worse off because of the transfer, and still be better off, whether or not the
compensation is in fact provided.17 Mainstream Law and Economics adheres sometimes to
Pareto but mostly to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. While ‘positive’ versions of this type of efficiency
analysis claim ‘merely’ to be able to explain and predict the operation of the law by reference to
what satisfies the most strongly valued preferences of those subject to (or sometimes, those
formulating) the law, the ‘normative’ versions – which would be candidates for being substantive
goals of the law – go further in asserting that fulfilling the most strongly valued preferences in
this way confers legitimacy or normative justification on the law.
First, however, Pareto efficiency is virtually unattainable in the real world in even the
most trivial transaction, since virtually any transaction inflicts uncompensated loss on at least
some of those not party to the transaction, who are nevertheless interested either in the object of
the transaction or in any of the substitutes or complements of that object. If and to the extent to
16
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which we desire our substantive goals to be practicably realisable, we must reject Pareto
efficiency as a substantive goal of the law. Secondly, given that virtually no transaction meets the
demanding conditions of Pareto efficiency, whatever distribution of resources exists at any given
time is also Pareto-optimal, and any move away from that distribution (for example, any
transaction involving the exchange of assets or entitlements) is Pareto inefficient.18 The pursuit of
Pareto efficiency is therefore a recipe for stasis!
Thirdly, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is normatively odious because it claims justification for
the uncompensated-for infliction of even horrendous harm to or expensive losses on some, as
long as a sufficiently large number of others thereby gain benefits for which each of them has
even a trivial individual preference. Taking a staple example, it is Kaldor-Hicks efficient to inflict
on a minority group some harm (say, legalised discrimination in the provision of jobs and
housing) to which this minority group would strongly prefer not to be subject, so long as there is
a sufficiently large majority group each of whose members has (even) a small individual
preference (based, let us assume, on prejudice of some sort) for the infliction of that harm which
cumulatively exceeds the dispreference of the minority. If and to the extent to which we consider
this outcome normatively unattractive,19 we must reject Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a substantive
goal of the law.
Fourth and interestingly, if and to the extent to which some individuals have a
sufficiently strong preference against the infliction of either uncompensated harm of the sort I
have just sketched out or other uncompensated losses, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency becomes
increasingly unlikely to be achieved. Indeed, this type of efficiency becomes impossible to attain
if there is just one person with such a strong preference against the infliction of non-consensual
losses on himself or others (that is, to the likely consequences of the implementation of KaldorHicks efficiency itself) that no amount of ex post compensation would suffice to make him as
well off as he would be in the absence of the infliction of those non-consensual losses!20
Fifth and in any case, both these versions of efficiency are indeterminate, since each of
them is susceptible to income, wealth and endowment effects (together, ‘wealth effects’). The
precise nature of one’s preferences and the degree to which one values them are both functions
of, inter alia, one’s income and wealth. It follows that an alteration in the distribution of income
or wealth would lead, in any given situation, to an alteration in the demands made by both Pareto
and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. For example, consider the sole supply of a rare hormone which can
either be employed so as to confer an extra couple of centimetres of height on a child C who is
blessed with very rich parents able and willing to outbid anyone else for the hormone, or can save
the life of a child D who must make do with very poor parents.21 Efficiency of either sort would
be achieved by ensuring that the hormone goes to C, thus satisfying the higher valued preferences
of C’s parents. The fact that such an outcome would be recommended by efficiency analysis,
regardless of the intrinsic worth of the competing potential uses, might itself be regarded as
18
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presumptively objectionable on moral grounds. In any case, however, if wealth had been
differently distributed such that D’s parents were able and willing to outbid C’s, efficiency would
demand that D received the hormone. It follows that unless we can be assured that the initial
distribution of (in this case) wealth is itself justified, there is no reason for thinking that satisfying
the strongest preferences produced by (among other things) that distribution of wealth would
confer any justification at all on whatever mechanism brought about that preference satisfaction.
What is more, it would be equally consistent with this type of efficiency analysis to alter
the initial distribution of wealth rather than satisfying the preferences created (inter alia) by that
distribution. To go back to the example of rich C and poor D, it would be as Pareto or KaldorHicks efficient to redistribute the wealth of C’s parents to D, and then to meet the then-stronger
preferences for the hormone of D’s parents, as to leave the initial distribution of wealth unaltered
and to meet the originally-stronger preferences of C’s parents. There is nothing in this type of
efficiency analysis to recommend satisfaction of the set of preferences existing in one state of
affairs (here, wealthy C family/poor D family) over the very different ones that would exist if that
state of affairs were itself to be altered (poor C family/wealthy D family). Hence (once again) the
indeterminacy.22
Sixth and finally on this point, claims of the sort underlying mainstream ‘normative’ Law
and Economics that the satisfaction of preferences (in one of the two ways explored above) is the
dominant, or even the exclusive, method for conferring legitimacy on the law are inherently
implausible, since they fail to distinguish between those aspects of life which we have reason to
shape in accordance with our preferences, and those aspects of life where we have reason to
shape our preferences in recognition of preference-independent values.23 To the extent to which
someone enjoys collecting stamps and has a preference for devoting some of his time to this
activity, this fact confers value (at least presumptively) on the time he spends doing so. Put
differently, the stamp collector has a valid reason, stemming (in part) from his preference for his
hobby, to dedicate some of his life to this activity.24 Correspondingly, a legal system which
enabled him to pursue his hobby (for example, by providing appropriate rules of contract and
property) would be justifiable for that reason. Suppose, however, that the stamp collector also has
a preference for torturing small animals or abusing people of a particular sexual orientation. The
fact of his preference, no matter how strongly held, would confer no legitimacy on a system
22
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which allowed him to indulge in these activities. Nor would a system allowing the torture of
small animals or the heaping of abuse on members of a particular group gain in legitimacy
because more and more people developed strongly held preferences for these activities.25 Instead,
the legal system would be morally justified in attempting to alter, or at least repress, the
expression of, these morally objectionable preferences. There are direct ethical analogues to this
moral point.26 Suppose the stamp collector has no preference for engaging in any other forms of
play,27 or for the pursuit of friendships (even, let us assume, with members of his family), or the
acquisition of knowledge, or the appreciation of art. Nevertheless, in the case of each of these
goods, he has valid reasons (whether he recognises them or not) for altering his preferences. His
life goes better if he does participate in some or more of these goods in some appropriate manner,
and is impoverished if he does not, other things being equal.28 In neither the moral nor the ethical
domain, then, would an absence on its subjects’ part of a preference for something (preferenceindependently) valuable or a preference for something (preference-independently) wrong shield
the legal system from moral condemnation or ethical reproach (as appropriate).
To reiterate this hugely abbreviated and simplified point: The fact that a set of legal
standards contributes to the satisfaction of (even strongly held) preferences confers normative
value upon that set – justifies it – if but only if those standards do not cause or enable a violation
of the fundamental moral rights of any of those affected by them, and do not encourage (or at
least, do not necessitate) the making of ethically perverse choices by them. It follows that any
approach, including any version of ‘normative’ Law and Economics, which claims for efficiency
(that is, for some form of preference satisfaction) the status of the exclusive or even dominant
substantive goal of the law, violates these crucial moral constraints and therefore must be
rejected.
C. The Role of Transaction Cost Efficiency
For these sorts of reasons, then, I reject Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as inappropriate to
legal analysis. I certainly do not, however, contra Duggan, “reject law and economics”, in favour
of either “a Rawlsian approach” or “an egalitarian perspective”.29 I must admit to being puzzled
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that Duggan thinks otherwise, when, for example, six pages in my book’s introductory chapter
are dedicated to explaining exactly what role efficiency plays in the argument,30 and when even
the book’s dust jacket records my claim that the ACM “can reconcile the dictates of fairness with
the demands of economic efficiency”.
Instead, as I took pains to explain in the book,31 while:
“efficiency can never be a substantive goal of the law[, and thus, while it] can never by
itself confer justification on any part of it, [] efficiency – understood properly – is quite
indispensable as a procedural goal. Once a set of substantive goals has been exogenously
specified (e.g. using a theory of justice), efficiency can be used to judge between various
proposed schemes for implementing it.”32
The procedural version of efficiency which I defend, drawing on the literature on transaction cost
economics, requires that a set of substantive goals be implemented in such a way that the process
of implementation would consume fewer resources than would be used up by adopting any other
feasible method of implementation. Or to put it another way, given a particular amount of
resources dedicated towards the implementation of a set of substantive goals, efficiency results
when those goals are operationalised to a greater degree than would be possible by adopting any
other feasible method.
Transaction cost efficiency aims to minimise two types of cost. Co-ordination costs are
the costs arising from the fact that there are limits on what people in the real world can foresee,
and on their cognitive capacity for selecting the appropriate response to a set of circumstances
presented to them. These costs also arise because there are informational asymmetries, e.g.
information relevant to the common plans of both A and B is available only to the former, or is
available to him to a greater degree than to the latter. The implication, given the aim of
implementing any set of substantive goals requiring co-operation, is that some resources would
have to be expended either ensuring that information is available to a fuller and more uniform
degree to all the relevant actors, or that the adverse effects of this not being the case are remedied.
Motivation costs arise because different actors, perceiving their interests not to lie in the same
direction, have different incentives about how to behave in any situation. Again given the aim of
implementing a set of substantive goals requiring co-operation, some resources would have to be
expended aligning their interests in such a way that the actors would be encouraged to pursue
those goals.
D. The Relationship between Egalitarianism and Efficiency
It should be clear, then, that in my work, efficiency analysis is not forsaken in favour of “a
Rawlsian approach” or “an egalitarian perspective”. Rather, an egalitarian theory of insolvency
law is drawn upon to specify the substantive goals of this law, and in addition, a particular
version of efficiency is deployed to assess whether the law goes about implementing those
substantive goals in a way that minimises waste.
“reject law and economics”, he attributes to me the more accurate claim that my work “subordinates
efficiency to egalitarianism”.
30
Corporate Insolvency, 20-26. At “Contractarianism”, 466, Duggan cites the opening part of this
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31
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I hope that this discussion will go some way towards resolving the mystery with which
Duggan appears to be grappling during much of his review. Time and time again, he stresses,
with something of an air of discovery and as if this were a point against me, that “the
methodology Mokal employs…is essentially an economic one… and he draws heavily on the
economics and law and economics literature”,33 that “efficiency is the driving consideration” in
my argument,34 that my reasoning is “essentially economic [in] nature”.35 Well, so it is (at least
on most of the points highlighted by Duggan), as long as one remembers the precise nature of the
efficiency at play and also its subordinate and merely instrumental role vis-à-vis the egalitarian
requirements of justice and fairness. I warned in the book36 that much Law and Economics
literature is confused because methodologically self-unaware, moving indiscriminately between
Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks and other versions of efficiency without realising it and without
understanding the implications of the differences between these versions, in particular, that the
first two purport (in my terminology) to be substantive goals of the law while some others can
only be procedural goals. In failing even to acknowledge my discussion of different versions of
efficiency, Duggan appears either to have overlooked these warnings, or at least implicitly, is not
persuaded that they pertain to a real danger of confusion. The latter position is in any case
invalidated by the nature of at least some of his own commentary.
Be that as it may, it seems to me that in order to make an argument against me on this
territory, Duggan would have to show not merely that I draw on economics or that my
conclusions would not offend “even the most ardent of free enterprise proponents”,37 but that I
mistakenly draw on one or other of the versions of efficiency I have condemned, or that I lose
sight of the primacy of the demands of justice in my eagerness to embrace economics. While I
might yet be liable to criticism on such grounds, Duggan’s review, as I read it, provides little
reason for thinking so.
III. THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The CBM, as propounded by Thomas Jackson, sometimes in collaboration with Robert Scott and
Douglas Baird, claims to be able to elucidate the deep structure of corporate insolvency law and
to assess its normative validity by reference to the preferences it claims would be expressed by
creditors ex ante, before any lending has taken place, and thus, well before the debtor has become
insolvent:38
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“[The CBM] views bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the agreement one would
expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate such an
agreement from an ex ante perspective”.39
A. The Supposed Operation of the CBM
The CBM’s explanation of the automatic stay is supposedly emblematic of the model’s
methodology. Why does corporate insolvency law impose a moratorium on the enforcement of
claims against an insolvent company? Because, replies the CBM, this is precisely what would
have been agreed to by all the creditors of that company, if only they could costlessly bargain
together ex ante.
The pre-insolvency method for debt collection is individualistic: in general, a creditor is
paid as and when its claim matures and it chooses to press it. The creditors of a common solvent
debtor have nothing to fear from each other since there is, by definition, sufficient value in the
debtor’s estate to satisfy them all.
Creditors bargaining ex ante anticipate, however, that all this would change if and when
doubts were to arise about the debtor’s solvency. By definition, an insolvent debtor would be
unable to meet all its liabilities in full. In that case, there would be a premium on ‘racing’ to
enforce claims: the earlier that a particular creditor could press its claim, the more likely it would
be to be paid in full, or at all. The tardy creditor could find itself with nothing, the debtor’s bones
having been picked dry by fellow claimants who had managed to swoop faster. Ex ante, all
creditors would regard this as problematic. First, some of them are likely to be risk-averse, and
would thus prefer a lower but more certain return on their prospective loan than the higher but
riskier one offered by the individualistic pre-insolvency collection method. Secondly, each of
them would have some incentive to monitor the debtor for the earliest signs of distress in order
most favourably to position themselves for the ensuing race. Much of the expenditure incurred by
the creditors as a group would, however, be necessarily duplicative and inefficacious. Regardless
of the aggregate of this expenditure, some of them would still be left with little or nothing in their
debtor’s insolvency. And thirdly, the debtor might merely be financially (and not economically)
distressed, so that its assets would be worth more if kept together as a going concern than they
would be if stripped from its business and sold off piecemeal. Nevertheless, if the only method
for the enforcement of claims were the individualistic pre-insolvency one, the debtor would be
required to meet claims one by one, as they were enforced. This would be likely to precipitate the
dismantling of the business, leading to the loss of any ‘going concern surplus’.
Bargaining ex ante, all the creditors would thus come to the conclusion that it would be in
the self-interest of each of them that they gave up their individualistic debt collection rights in
return for the entitlement to participate in a collective enforcement proceeding against the
insolvent debtor. In this collective forum, any going concern surplus would be preserved by
making a once-and-for-all decision on behalf of all creditors about the value maximising manner
of disposing of the debtor’s business. The need to incur duplicative monitoring costs would be
mitigated because claims would be met in a rational and orderly fashion, and not merely in the
order in which they were brought. And for the same reason, risk-averse creditors would be
assured a more certain if lower return within the collective forum than they would expect if left to
fend for themselves under the individualistic system. The collective regime characterised by the
automatic stay merely duplicates the effects of this hypothetical ex ante bargain, asserts the CBM,
39
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Yale LJ 857 (‘Jackson, “Bankruptcy”), 860-861, as cited by Duggan, “Contractarianism”, 463-4 and 467.
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thus eliminating the costs that real-life creditors would have to incur trying in fact to negotiate a
moratorium on claims in anticipation of the possibility of their mutual debtor’s insolvency.
I accept that the need to mitigate risk-aversion, to control duplicative monitoring costs, to
preserve any going concern surplus, and to eliminate the need for factual ex ante bargains, all are
relevant considerations in attempting to understand and justify the automatic stay. I deny,
however, that the CBM can account for them, or for the automatic stay, or for any other aspect of
insolvency law, in anything like the manner described above, or in any other coherent manner. In
order to vindicate this apparently harsh judgement, and so as to address Duggan’s observations, I
will focus in the following sub-sections on some of the basic building blocks of the CBM.40
B. ‘Agreement’ in the Hypothetical Bargain
How does the CBM go about identifying the propositions to which it claims all the relevant
creditors would have agreed? And what is the nature of this hypothetical agreement? While
answering these questions merely requires making explicit what is implicit in the discussion thus
far, the results might nevertheless surprise those tempted by the model’s explanation of the
automatic stay.
Note first of all that the CBM, as a member of a family of theories based in classical
microeconomics, claims that while each relevant creditor41 pursues nothing except its own
interests, that the product of this pursuit is, nevertheless, the collectively desirable state of
efficiency.42 Recall the point made in the previous section of this paper, that those writing in the
Law and Economics tradition are often methodologically unself-conscious, frequently do not
appreciate the (analytical, let alone moral) significance of the distinction between Pareto, KaldorHicks, and other forms of efficiency, and often switch between versions as if the differences did
not matter. The progenitors of the CBM are good exemplars of these tendencies. They are usually
not explicit about the nature of the efficiency analysis which they deploy. When minded to make
their position explicit, however, they rely usually on Kaldor-Hicks,43 and less often, on Pareto.44
We reach the same conclusion about the CBM’s exclusive focus upon the individual selfinterest of each creditor from a different (and independently instructive) direction. When the
CBM claims creditors consulted ex ante would consent to certain provisions, how does it
ascertain what those provisions would be? No actual consent has expressly been given to any
such provisions; that is precisely why resort must be had to an hypothetical agreement. Nor is
there any actual unexpressed consent, that is, consent present (as it were) in the minds of all the
relevant creditors even if not made explicit by them. Creditors come in many varieties, many of
40

For detailed textual and substantive support for the arguments that follow, see Corporate Insolvency,
chapter 2. Only a quick summary can be provided here.
41
That is, each creditor X of whom each of the following propositions is true: (i) X would be driven by its
self-interest into the hypothetical agreement, and, (ii) each other creditor, again driven by their respective
interests, would accept X into that agreement. More than once, Duggan appears to have overlooked the
second of these necessary conditions; see for example the discussion of tort creditors, below, and of C1, C2
and C2, further below.
42
While it is difficult to prove a negative, the reader is invited to consult the writings of the CBM’s
progenitors to confirm that they do not attribute to creditors any motivation except individual self-interest.
For further explanation and for an outline of the intellectual antecedents of the CBM in the work of Richard
Posner, see Corporate Insolvency, 36 and 40-47; note also to whom Logic and Limits is dedicated, at v.
43
See for example Jackson, “Bankruptcy”, 870, footnote 61; and Robert Scott, “The Truth About Secured
Financing” (1997), 82 Cornell LR 1436.
44
See for example Jackson, “Bankruptcy”, 874, footnote 78.
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whom (for example, most employees, consumer pre-payers, many trade creditors, to say nothing
of any tort claimants) would not even realise that they were classified by law as creditors, and
even if they did, would have no idea of how they would be treated in their debtor’s insolvency.
Therefore, any suggestion that such creditors have in fact given some sort of actual, even if
unexpressed, consent to the stay would be incredible. In any case, the CBM provides no evidence
whatsoever to this effect.
What about reconstructed consent, then? This is the sort attributed to the parties to a
contract in circumstances where a term is to be implied in the contract, on the basis that a
reasonable person in their shoes would have consented to the inclusion of that term. But this does
not help either. Reconstructed consent is usually presumptive (a term will not be implied where
the contract explicitly provides to the contrary) and so cannot be invoked with respect to a
compulsory legal standard (the automatic stay would apply even if an unsecured creditor had lent
to the debtor expressly subject to the condition that the former would be immune from the stay in
the latter’s insolvency). Further, reconstructed consent with respect to an implied term can be
attributed to the parties only because they have actually consented to entry into the contract.45 In
more general terms, it is only when a person has given actual consent to his participation in a
particular institution (in our example just now, contract) that it is permissible to attribute
reconstructed consent to him with respect to a particular feature of that institution (in our
example, a particular implied term). However, the CBM must, and claims to be able to, justify
subjecting the parties to the coercion inherent in insolvency law in the first place, and in
particular, that underlying the automatic stay. So it can not, if it is to avoid begging the question,
have recourse to the sort of consent which would be regarded as having come into existence only
because, and by virtue of, the creditors actually having consented to the application to them of
insolvency law. And finally on reconstructed consent, the ‘reasonable person’ is regarded as
having consented to the term in question only because there are consideration quite independent
of consent which make it reasonable to conclude that the parties would have accepted that term.
Without an adequate account of those consent-independent considerations, therefore, the
argument from reconstructed consent would not even get off the ground.
This brings us to counterfactual consent, which, as the label indicates, is consent the
parties have never in fact given. This label usefully reminds us that such consent can be attributed
to someone only at the conclusion of the argument, that is, only when the person wishing to make
the attribution has explained why he considers it reasonable to suppose that consent would have
been given, even though it never in fact was. This is precisely the form of consent at play in the
CBM, and the only reason in favour of attribution offered by that model’s progenitors – the only
reason their model has the resources to provide – is that some or other aspect of insolvency law
(in our example, the automatic stay) is in the independent self-interest of each (relevant) creditor.
So the CBM draws on standard efficiency analysis (of the sort described in the previous
section) to claim that if consulted ex ante, each creditor, driven by self-interest, would have
expressed a preference for the automatic stay. The stay is justified because it is Kaldor-Hicks, or
perhaps, Pareto, efficient.
This highlights the first set of problems for the CBM. If the move from the individualistic
to the collective regime is Pareto efficient, then each relevant creditor (if conceived of,
problematically, as driven by their self-interest alone) could plausibly be regarded as having
consented to it. However, this simply does not hold if the move is merely Kaldor-Hicks (but not
45

See for example Anne de Moor, “Intention in the Law of Contract: Elusive or Illusory?” (1990), 106
LQR 632.
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Pareto) efficient. Suppose some creditors (each driven by their individual self-interest alone)
would be better off under the individualistic regime than under the collective one.46 Such
creditors obviously have no reason to prefer the latter to the former simply on the basis that their
competitors (that is, creditors who would be better off under the collective regime than the
individualistic one) could have compensated them for the individualistic-to-collective move
though in fact did not do so. No hypothetical agreement in support of any rule or policy can be
manufactured out of an argument that that rule or policy is Kaldor-Hicks (but not Pareto)
efficient.47 It follows that unless the CBM can show that the automatic stay is Pareto efficient, it
must abandon any claim that the stay would have attracted the consent of all the relevant
creditors.
Secondly, however, and keeping in mind the discussion in the previous section of this
paper, why should we care whether or not the automatic stay results in Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency? After all, these forms of efficiency are both question-begging and indeterminate
because susceptible to wealth effects, and Kaldor-Hicks in particular is normatively odious. So
even if the CBM were (though as we shall see, it is not) able to demonstrate that either form of
efficiency would be achieved upon the implementation of the stay, that would confer no
justification on it, for the reasons discussed above.48
Let us turn to the third set of issues for the model, which I will raise here and consider
after having discussed certain other elements of the CBM. Note that self-interest is a function of
knowledge: It would, for example, be in the interests of a risk-preferring punter to buy a ticket in
a fair lottery if his interest is reckoned ex ante, before the lottery has taken place (or at something
of a stretch, before he has discovered the result of the lottery). Buying the ticket would not be in
his interests ex post, that is, if it is already known that the ticket in question has lost. This is a
perfectly general point: buying home insurance is in your interests if you do not know whether or
not your home will burn down. It might not be in your interests, however, if you somehow have
perfectly reliable knowledge that your home will never burn down. Correspondingly, selling you
insurance is in the interests of the insurance company if it is not known whether or not your home
will burn down, but might not be in its interests if it is known with perfect certainty that your
home will burn down. And so on. The CBM relies on the self-interest of each (relevant) creditor
in asserting that each of them would have agreed in the ex ante hypothetical bargain to the
imposition upon them of the automatic stay. Obviously, therefore, it must specify with sufficient
precision exactly when, ex ante, this bargain supposedly takes place. Does it?
Further, recall again that the CBM would regard a particular creditor X as having given
consent to the automatic stay if, and to the extent to which, the stay would be in X’s self-interest.
However, X’s self-interest is likely to shift from time to time. It follows that the propositions to
which it could be considered to have consented would also change accordingly. To illustrate this
point, suppose that at time t1, X is a weak, over-stretched trade creditor. It anticipates being
unable to spend much on monitoring its debtor and racing for its assets, should the debtor become
46

As is indeed the case; see below.
See further Ronald Dworkin, “Why Efficiency?” (1980), 8 Hofstra LR 563.
48
The foregoing discussion also suggests that Duggan, “Contractarianism”, 471, is mistaken in suggesting
that the CBM attaches merely predictive, but no normative, significance to the assumption that creditors are
motivated by their respective self-interest. The model takes the maximal satisfaction of self-interested
preferences to be its sole source of justification. It is not so much that the CBM asserts that the creditors
ought to be motivated by self-interest, more that it has no resources for conceiving of what else there is that
might motivate them. This point, explained at some length in Corporate Insolvency, chapters 2 and 3,
particularly 87-90, relates to the fundamental reason why the ‘contractarian’ CBM differs from the
‘contractualist’ ACM.
47
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financially distressed. X also expects there to be other, better-resourced creditors who would beat
it in any such individualistic race. When consulted at this time, therefore, suppose that X indicates
consent to the automatic stay, on the basis that it would be in its self-interest to neutralise the
individualistic advantages of its better-resourced competitors. At a later time t2, however, X,
having made a succession of profitable deals, finds plenty of resources at its disposal to expend
on monitoring any prospective debtors. It now states that it wishes to change its choice, opting to
remain subject to the individualistic regime in the expectation that it could beat most of its rivals
in most races it might run to collect debts under the individualistic regime.49 Should X be allowed
to resile from its actual consent? Note that if this question is answered in the affirmative, then the
similar question premised on X’s implied consent must a fortiori be answered in the affirmative.
If actual consent in such circumstances does not bind, nor would any variety of implied consent.50
So, is X’s change of mind condemnable, because normatively suspect in some way? This
depends on the sort of choice X was asked to make. If what was required of it was merely an
expression of its preferences, as is the case within the CBM, then there is nothing objectionable in
changing one’s preferences in line with one’s self-interest. It would be perfectly permissible –
indeed, more accurate – to say that X prefers the collective regime marked by the automatic stay
up until time t2, and the individualistic regime thereafter. It would be another matter if X had
been asked to pick what it regarded as the fair or just rule (or even the most economically
efficient one). Its change of mind would then smack of hypocrisy. But under the CBM, the only
question to which X can be regarded as having given an answer is simply what is in its selfinterest.
It would be no answer to say here that the choice made before time t2 would have
encouraged legitimate expectations about how future transactions would be dealt with, so it
should be held binding. Remember that the order of choices is arbitrary and could be reversed (a
rich creditor which had chosen the individualistic regime before t2 is newly-impoverished and
only now wishes to choose the collective one). In that case, the CBM would insist upon the legal
reification of the choice for the individualistic regime, hence providing no support for our
collective system. Or it might be stipulated that the choice made at t2 should only affect
transactions taking place at later times t3, t4, etc. Since there would then be no retroactivity, there
could be no confounded expectations, and the automatic stay could be abandoned thenceforth for
the free-for-all system.
Now of course a legal system can not allow its insolvency rules to change in line with
the whims of one or other creditor. To say that, however, is not to support but to condemn the
CBM. There is nothing in that model itself which weaves together non-binding preferences into
binding rules. In the example above, the model can not explain why X’s preference for the
collective regime should be considered as overriding its later preference for the individualistic
regime (or indeed vice versa). So the model provides no justification for the coercion inherent in
the collective regime. Nor, as noted, can it be any response at all that the preferences with which
the CBM is concerned are “implied”, not real. If one’s real choices do not bind, then why should
49

X does not require a “sure way of knowing that it will have the same advantage over other creditors in all
future cases”, contra Duggan, “Contractarianism”, 468 (emphasis added). The individualistic regime is in
its interests so long as its net expected returns from winning a proportion of races (taking into account the
expected costs of losing the others) under the individualistic regime is greater than the expected returns
from participation in the collective regime. X’s example is set up precisely so as to suggest that at time t2,
this cost/benefit analysis favours X’s remaining under the individualistic regime.
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For a similar argument, see Daniel Brudney, “Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force” (1991), 10 Law
and Philosophy 235, 238-239.
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choices that one never actually made? And crucially, there are no substantive or procedural
constraints in the model to ensure that the rules picked (actually or counterfactually) would be
considered binding.
Here, then, are some of the challenges that the CBM must meet. In determining whether
the automatic stay would have been consented to, exactly when is the self-interest of each of the
creditors to be measured? And what makes that point privileged, so that even mere preferences
shaped by self-interest alone, if expressed at that time, ought to be considered binding, contrary to
the import of the argument I just outlined?
As we move to the next part of the discussion, however, the reader should be aware that
while the points I have just highlighted were all considered in great detail in the book, as were
their implications for the CBM, Duggan does not even advert, let alone respond, to any of them in
his review, even when he outlines and defends what he considers to be a different, more tenable
version of the CBM. As we will see, that leaves Duggan’s preferred form of the CBM open to
precisely the criticisms that I levelled against the ‘standard’ forms of that model (even assuming
for the moment that Duggan has identified a variant on those standard forms).
C. The Real Parties Premise and Imaginary ‘Creditors’
It is important to note that the CBM is supposedly based on the hypothetical consent of the actual
creditors who would come to be affected by corporate insolvency law, and for the purposes of our
example, by the automatic stay:
“[The] hypothetical bargain analysis provides indirect evidence of what real world parties
would, in fact, agree to.”51
This ‘Real Parties premise’ implies that the various bargainers are (and as we will see below,
know that they are) secured or unsecured,52 that some are “systematically faster... or friendlier
with Debtor” than others,53 and that they are able to affect the (notional) bargaining process
differently according to their “relative savvy and bargaining skills”.54
It is important to understand that without the Real Parties premise, nothing would be left
of the CBM. In its justificatory role, this model is supposed to legitimate the real-life coercion
inherent in the automatic stay against real-life creditors (they are deprived of the freedom of
action and any other advantages available to them under the individualistic pre-insolvency debtcollection regime). Suppose that such an actual creditor C, who is well-poised to win an
individualistic race for the insolvent’s assets, finds that he has been deprived of this advantage by
the automatic stay. How would the CBM justify this to him? Suppose that the model is not based
on what actual people would have done, and we run through its arguments with C. C’s response
would surely be along these lines: “So you say the imaginary participants in an imaginary
agreement would have given imaginary consent to the stay. Fine, those imaginary people must be
held to their imaginary choices. How precisely does that justify depriving me of my advantageous
51

Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott, “On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and
the Creditors’ Bargain” (1989), 75 Virginia LR 155 (‘Jackson and Scott, “Nature”), 160. I reproduce this
quotation here to indicate the centrality of this feature of the CBM even in what Duggan describes as an
“expanded” and at least in some ways “more nuanced” version of that model; see “Contractarianism”, 478.
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Jackson, Bankruptcy, 59 fn. 80.
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Ibid., 15.
54
Ibid., 30.
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position?” To avoid C’s retorting thus, the CBM must, at the very least, be able to claim that the
stay would have been consented to, not by some non-existent ‘archetypal’ or ‘representative’
creditors, but by C himself ex ante. Only then can the model even attempt to justify coercing the
non-fictional C into giving up his favourable position.55
In any case, it would not take matters any further to say that the CBM is based on the
choices of fictional creatures of some description, perhaps of ‘representative’ creditors of the sort
we could expect to find in various insolvency cases. Duggan attempts to defend the CBM in this
sort of way, by suggesting that it might be consistent with the model’s role for it to ask:
“no longer about actual creditors’ likely preferences in a particular case [but rather to
focus on] what the legislator [hoping to be informed by the CBM about the appropriate
response to corporate insolvency] thinks creditors are likely to prefer across the range of
insolvency cases.”56
This, however, veers dangerously close to missing the point. The CBM refers either to the
hypothetical consent that would supposedly be given to the automatic stay by the actual creditors
in an, or any given, insolvency, or it does not. If the latter, then the model’s hypothetical
‘consent’ is shown up even at this early stage as a fake incapable of telling us anything about how
“real world parties” ought to be dealt with. It is no good talking about “the range”57 of
insolvencies, unless you can analyse (let us be generous) at least a very large proportion of actual
insolvencies in a way consistent with the model, unless you can point to the actual creditors in
these insolvencies and employ the CBM to show why the automatic stay is, for each of them as
an individual, in their interest. If this cannot be done, then it must surely be conceded that the
model is unfaithful to its defining tenet, and is unable to show that the automatic stay in fact
mirrors the self-interest-driven agreement that would have been struck by those actual creditors to
whom it now applies.
Remember, after all, that the bargain is supposed to be a hypothetical one, and no
transaction costs are involved. We must ask why the CBM still needs, as Duggan appears to be
suggesting it does, to resort to the agreement of fictional creatures one might expect, in some
unexplained way, to encounter in “the range” of insolvencies. If it can prove that actual creditors
in an, or any given, insolvency would agree to the stay if they could bargain together without
incurring transaction costs, any argument that some elusive creatures somehow ‘representative’ of
possible future creditors in “the range” of insolvency cases would do the same is superfluous and
simply pointless. But suppose the CBM must appeal to the consent of these fictional creatures –
must, as it were, narrow its eyes so as to omit the precise details of any given case, in an attempt
to capture the broad outline of “the range” of insolvency cases – because it can not prove that
55

It is clear this is what the model’s progenitors are in fact trying to achieve; see e.g.. Jackson and Scott,
“Nature”, 160.
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“Contractarianism”, 468, defining what he calls ‘Position 2’. I attempt to make sense of this rather
mysterious construct below. For the time being, however, note Duggan’s contrast between [A] “actual
creditors’ likely preferences in a particular case” and [B] “what the legislator thinks creditors are likely to
prefer across the range of insolvency cases”. The creditors involved in each one of “the range” of
insolvency cases are of course “actual creditors in [that] particular case”. On Duggan’s understanding of
the CBM, then, is this model based on the likely preferences of actual creditors in (at the very least) a
majority of these cases? While I am not certain, the tenor of this part of Duggan’s argument, including, as
noted, the manner in which he contrasts [A] and [B], does suggest to me that he does not think so.
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I will stick to Duggan’s words in this argument since it is difficult to be confident about how the
expression “the range” of insolvency cases is to be understood: it is unclear whether it refers to all such
cases, or most of them, or a sufficiently large minority of them, etc.
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actual creditors themselves in an actual insolvency would have agreed to the automatic stay. In
that case, the model must explain how fictional creatures with all the relevant attributes of actual
creditors would come to a different decision. And if these fictional creatures do not have all the
relevant attributes of actual creditors, then how do their supposed decisions justify coercion
against actual creditors who are different in those relevant respects?58 Again, the only answer
available within the framework of the CBM is that while it concerns hypothetical choices, those
choices would have been made by Real Parties in any (or all) actual transactions.
D. Natural Ignorance, Tort Creditors and Shareholders
Note next that the hypothetical bargain is to be concluded by Real Parties negotiating with each
other in what I called ‘Natural Ignorance’. In this state, the parties, while unaware of the eventual
outcome of the (or, I suppose, any particular) transaction in anticipation of which they are
bargaining, remain aware at all times of their own identities and attributes and of how they would
be treated if there were no automatic stay. So for example:
“A central premise underlying this Creditors’ Bargain conceptualization is that a system
of [non-insolvency] law entitlements is already in place and that parties know [at the time
that the hypothetical bargain is to be struck] what their priority positions will be so long
as [non-insolvency] law continues to govern their rights.”59
Natural Ignorance allows parties to know whether they are secured or unsecured, faster at
collecting debts or friendlier with the debtor or better at bargaining than other creditors.60 This
knowledge shapes the process of (the notional) negotiations.
It is important to remember not only the brute fact, testified to by their text, that the
progenitors of the CBM explicitly base their model on Natural Ignorance, but also that
acknowledging their adherence to it is the only way in which to explain certain highly important
aspects of their model.
The treatment of involuntary creditors (for example, victims of the debtor’s tort with
claims for compensation against it) is a particularly illuminating example.61 The CBM’s
progenitors have in mind an hypothetical agreement among real people who know they will lend
to the company but do not know what will then happen to their debtor’s business. Naturally,
therefore, they think real involuntary creditors could not be invited to participate in the notional
bargain, since they would not know at that time (ex ante) that they would later unexpectedly be
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The same applies mutatis mutandis to the analytic role of the CBM. If the only thing the CBM can
explain is how the automatic stay serves the interests of fictional people who do not bear sufficient
resemblance to real-life creditors, then it provides little help in understanding the real world.
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Jackson and Scott, “Nature”, 160; this, remember, is according to Duggan the “expanded” and “more
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See the treatment of these points in what Duggan calls the “simple” version of the CBM, Jackson,
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forced to extend credit. It is for this reason that the model’s progenitors state that involuntary
creditors “would not fairly be considered participants in a creditors’ bargain.”62
I pointed out in the book that it would not help to suggest that all that the CBM’s
progenitors would need to change their position on this point would be for them to ask what rule
would hypothetically be picked by tort claimants before they knew that the tort would be
committed against them.63 The reason, I argued, was that this move would contradict Natural
Ignorance, a fundamental element of the model. Without responding to this point, Duggan asserts
that a few minor tweaks to the model (which I consider below) would enable it to cover tort
claimants:
“it is plausible to suppose that a prospective tort victim, bargaining in advance of the
law, would agree on a collective system of debt collection in the debtor’s insolvency if
assured of the kind of ‘disaster relief’ [envisaged by the CBM’s progenitors].”64
Two immediate problems with Duggan’s suggestion are worth noting. First, if it really
was so obvious that the explanatory and justificatory ambit of the CBM could so easily be
expanded so as to include tort claimants, it would seem surprising (to put it no more strongly) that
the perceptive people writing in the CBM tradition failed to spot this trick. This surprise could
only intensify when it is noticed that the proponents of the CBM had not simply overlooked the
position of tort claimants. Instead, they explicitly considered whether the CBM could be
developed so as to cover such claimants, but upon reflection and even in the “expanded” and
“more nuanced” version of the model,65 concluded that it would be conceptually impossible for it
to do so:
“[Whatever] the merits of the claim that society owes [tort] victims protection[,] this
protection does not derive from the consensual arrangements that would underlie any ex
ante Creditors’ Bargain. Distributions to nonconsensual claimants are conceptually
different from those that would be agreed to in any bargain in which individual selfinterest was a central feature.”66
Secondly and in any case, however, Duggan’s suggestion lacks plausibility. He says, as
we saw, that tort claimants might, by being promised certain advantages, be persuaded to
participate in the collective regime characterised by the automatic stay. But tort claimants cannot
bargain with themselves. The idea behind the CBM is that all creditors participating in the
hypothetical negotiations with each other would come to realise that it would be better for each of
them to co-operate in creating the collective regime than to compete under the individualistic one.
The desire to avoid having to compete provides the incentive to co-operate.67 So what about the
other creditors? What advantage would they see in bargaining to a co-operative agreement with
62
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tort claimants rather than to compete against them? As I explained in the book,68 bargaining in
this context would be about giving up some pre-agreement leverage in return for other bargainers
doing the same. That at the very least is involved in the give-and-take of negotiations to reach an
agreement. But what would your average tort claimant, or even a group of them, have to offer to
bank-, director/shareholder-, Crown-, trade- and even employee-creditors in order to tempt them
into giving up some of the advantages they enjoy under the general (pre-insolvency) law?
Would these other types of claimant be worried that in an individualistic race to collect
on debts against their mutual debtor, tort claimants might pip them at the post? Any suggestion to
that effect would be fantastical. Under the pre-insolvency law, tort claimants in general require
far more time and consume more resources in even establishing their claim than other types of
creditor. They might have to prove that the debtor owed them a duty of care, for example, and
that it had breached that duty. Contrast the position of most contractual claimants who would
simply point to the terms of the contract, or the taxing departments of the Crown who must show
merely that the debtor had traded and/or consumed goods or services, or even employees who
must establish only that they had worked for a period for the debtor. Tort claimants then generally
need to demonstrate that the debtor’s breach of duty has resulted in harm to them, and they must
provide evidence and arguments with a view to quantifying that harm. Taking this last step is
particularly difficult for those who have suffered latent injuries or those who are remote in the
chain of causation, etc. Note again the contrast with most other types of creditor. Non-tort
creditors are for this reason hardly likely to be left quaking in their racing shoes at the thought of
having to compete against tort claimants. This would be even truer of those creditors – banks, the
Crown, certain commercial counterparties – who are repeat players in the market and thus
relatively more used to having to collect from recalcitrant debtors than the average tort claimant.
Nor can most tort claimants gain much leverage in the hypothetical bargaining process by
claiming credibly that under the individualistic regime, instead of necessarily having to litigate
against the debtor, they would be able to put pressure on it to settle out of court. Disregard for a
minute the fact that settlement negotiations usually operate in the shadow of the law in any case,
so that the difficulties expected to be encountered in litigation by tort claimants would also for
that reason be relevant to determining whether they would be able to compel the debtor to settle.
Consider again the difference between the leverage available to tort and to other claimants. The
average debtor might wish to keep its bank happy out of fear that the latter would otherwise
starve it of funds or call in its loans or seize collateral; might wish to keep particular trade
creditors onside in case they withdrew custom or favourable terms; might wish to retain the
services of at least some key employees in order to continue trading; and perhaps, might even fear
that non-payment of taxing authorities might provoke them to shut it down using the sorts of
administrative or quasi-judicial powers available to such authorities in some jurisdictions. But it
is difficult to imagine from what source the average tort claimant might gain some similar
leverage over the debtor. In general, the debtor simply does not need the co-operation of this
category of claimant. What is more, whereas a solvent company might be concerned about the
reputational damage that might result from leaving (particularly a large group of) tort claimants
unpaid, a distressed company could be expected to attach much greater relative weight to the
immediate and more certain harms of the sort described previously in this paragraph than the
more remote and more speculative harm to its reputation.
The point is simply this. The CBM explains the nature of the collective regime by
claiming that all the relevant creditors would agree to abstain from racing against each other
because they would regard this to be in their self-interest. However, no plausible reasons are
68
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available to suggest that non-tort claimants would find it in their interest to allow tort claimants to
take the benefit of participation in an agreement in which non-tort claimants gave up their
respective pre-insolvency enforcement advantages. Since non-tort claimants have no reason to
fear having to compete with tort claimants under the individualistic system, they correspondingly
have no incentive to co-operate with them so as to create a collective one.69
That the CBM simply cannot accommodate the position of tort claimants70 is not some
unfriendly accusation that I have levelled at the CBM. The progenitors of that model themselves
considered the issue in some detail while propounding the “expanded” and “more nuanced”
version of the model. They came to the explicit conclusion, as noted, that any protection afforded
by insolvency law to tort creditors was not conceptually consistent with the model’s prescriptions,
given the model’s “central” dependence on the self-interest of creditors in manufacturing the
hypothetical agreement.71 And while there is much on which I differ from them, there is no doubt
in my mind that they were right on this point, for the sorts of reasons I have just explained.
In the course of a sentence in one of his footnotes, however, Duggan overrules us all.72 A
more detailed account of his reasons for doing so would have been illuminating.73
Note, finally, that in assessing the success or otherwise of the CBM, whether the interests
of shareholders can be accommodated within this model is, in and of itself, of no great probative
interest to me. Duggan may think otherwise.74 I concede that a fragment of one sentence of my
text on the page cited by Duggan is unqualified (“shareholders are not included in Jackson’s
model”). Duggan’s reading of that fragment shows that it ought not to have been so unqualified.
Be that as it may, I am not, and have never been, committed to the view that the CBM cannot be
propounded so as to include shareholders. Note, first, that immediately prior to the sentence in
question, I cited75 that part of the work of the CBM’s progenitors which expands the model to
include shareholders.76 This should indicate, I hope, that I am not committed to any unqualified
proposition that the CBM could not be modified so as to accommodate shareholders in some
appropriate capacity. Secondly and in further support of this point: in a paper published in 2000,
when I was still sympathetic to the CBM tradition, I myself explicitly expanded the ‘Creditors’’
Bargain so as to include shareholders within its ambit!77 Admittedly, this might not be readily
apparent to someone who had read the book but not that previous paper.78 Finally and most

69

Alternatively, even if agreement were to be reached, it would be one reflecting the pre-agreement
advantages and disadvantages of the various parties, not one pursuant to which non-tort claimants would
give up their superior position vis-à-vis tort claimants for the privilege simply of being treated on par with
them. This point is considered below.
70
Alternatively, that tort creditors ought to enjoy an inferior position within the insolvency system, given
their comparatively weaker position in the hypothetical bargain as against other types of claimant.
71
See again Jackson and Scott, “Nature”, 177.
72
“Contractarianism”, 470, footnote 30.
73
The reason he does provide – his invocation of what he calls Position 2 – is examined in the following
sub-section.
74
“Contractarianism”, 464, including footnote 10, citing Corporate Insolvency, 69.
75
Corporate Insolvency, 69, footnote 36.
76
Jackson and Scott, “Nature”, 194-196.
77
See Mokal, “An Agency Cost Analysis of the Wrongful Trading Provisions: Redistribution, Perverse
Incentives and the Creditors’ Bargain” (2000) 59(2) Cambridge LJ 335 (‘Mokal, “Wrongful Trading”),
345-346.
78
That said, see, however, Corporate Insolvency, 276-279, particularly text to footnote 71, and footnote 72.
On these pages, citing my 2000 paper, I sketched out (and then rejected) the argument that in a real-life ex

- 19 -

importantly, however, the substance of the discussion of which the fragment in question forms
part could, on a good day, have spoken for itself. The sentiment in this part of my discussion was
that the ACM “rejects the narrow concerns of the CBM, which restricts participation in the ex
ante agreement to those who have contracted for legal rights to the debtor’s assets once
insolvency has occurred”.79 Shareholders, qua shareholders, do not fall into this category. This
remains true of every version of the model that has been explicated by the progenitors of the
CBM. Even when, as in the work I mentioned at the top of this paragraph, shareholders have been
let into the model, this has been in their capacity as contributors of post-distress “new value” to
the debtor, and not merely qua its original shareholders. And the remainder of the sentence on
whose fragment Duggan apparently relies refers in this context to tort creditors, who are, as I
noted there, not given entry into the model.
To reiterate: I claimed in the book80 that the ACM does, in a manner that the CBM
cannot, provide a voice to each of those parties (including, as and if appropriate, the debtor itself,
its shareholders, managers, all creditors voluntary or not, and anyone else at all) who is affected
by peculiar insolvency issues. I still adhere to that view.
E. The Incoherence of the Ex Ante Position
Does the CBM’s ex ante position specify a unique, morally privileged point, which is determinate
rather than forever shifting in line with each party’s assessment of their self-interest, and which is
such that even preferences driven merely by self-interest ought to be considered binding if
ascertained as at that point?
I have argued that the answer to both questions must be a clear no. On no interpretation
of the ex ante position does it constitute a unique or morally privileged point in time, and any
consent counterfactually given by Real Parties in Natural Ignorance cannot be considered
binding. Consider an analogy based on the same premises:
Suppose I did not know the value of my painting on Monday; if you had offered me $100
for it then, I would have accepted. On Tuesday I discovered it was valuable. You cannot
argue that it would be fair for the courts to make me sell it to you for $100 on
Wednesday. It may be my good fortune that you did not ask me on Monday; but that does
not justify coercion against me later.81
For those tempted to respond that this analogy is unfair to the CBM since it turns on a mistake,
here is a variant: If you had asked me on Monday, I would have sold my share portfolio to you
for its then $100 market value. You did not, and the market value of the shares jumped to $10,000
on Tuesday. It should be obvious that my counterfactual consent on Monday would not justify
forcing me on Wednesday to hand the portfolio over to you for $100, on the basis that I would
have been willing to, though I did not in fact, sell it to you for that price. Counterfactual consent
given by Real Parties in Natural Ignorance justifies nothing.

ante bargain, creditors, shareholders and managers would all agree to tie the managers’ loyalty to the
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Or consider the automatic stay itself. Here is Scenario 1. C Ltd. is in a line of business
which requires the extension of credit. Of the first ten loans C ever makes, five have to be
collected through court proceedings. Three of these debtors go into insolvent liquidation. C is
young, its employees are still learning to work together, and its finance director is inexperienced
in ordinary (non-insolvency) debt-collection procedures. If asked before extending credit whether
the automatic stay on unsecured claims was in its self-interest, C would have replied in the
affirmative all five times. Of its next ten loans, there are again court proceedings against five
debtors and three of these again end up in insolvent liquidation. C’s employees are now proficient
and well-coordinated, and its finance director can count on them to ensure claims will be filed,
and judgments obtained and executed, speedily. If now asked before making each of the bad
loans, C would calculate that the automatic stay was in fact not in its self-interest, since it could
do far better under the individualistic non-insolvency regime. Now the Real Parties premise
requires “actual people, deploying actual endowments of skill” to make the calculation of selfinterest. So we must ask C whether it finds the stay acceptable. But what is the correct ex ante
position from which this calculation is to be made by C? Is it at the very beginning, when C has
just started in the business of lending? Or after its tenth loan, or its tenth bad loan? It matters
immensely when the calculation is made, but the ex ante position as defined by Natural Ignorance
provides no answers.82
But if we can not decide when to ascertain creditors’ self-interest, we can not decide
whether they would consent (counterfactually) to the automatic stay. Remove counterfactual
consent, and nothing is left. The whole edifice comes tumbling down. The CBM justifies nothing.
But perhaps the argument sketched out above misunderstands the notion of the ex ante
position? Perhaps the focus should not be on one creditor over a series of transactions, but rather
on all the creditors in a (or any) transaction. Judged ex ante, then, before any loans are made,
would it be in the self-interest of each relevant creditor to accept the stay on unsecured claims?
This version of the notion of the ex ante position actually makes things a bit worse. Here
is Scenario 2. Let us take C Ltd. as it is after having made twenty loans and having dealt with the
consequences, a consummate collector of debts, lining up to extend credit for the twenty-first
time. Let us also consider E, F and G, highly-skilled computer engineers who work for the
debtor-to-be at a time when there are plenty of such engineers in the job market, and who have
never worked for an employer which became insolvent. They of course will become creditors for
back pay and accrued holiday remuneration, etc. Before any lending takes place, C’s finance
director meets with E, F and G to make a binding choice as to what should happen, should their
debtor become insolvent. It is suggested here that no agreement can take place. The Natural
Ignorance premise allows parties to be aware of their own attributes, to know one of them is
“systematically faster” than others. Under these conditions, C would insist on a free-for-all
system, while E, F and G, knowing they can never compete, would hold out for the stay on all
claims.
This game can be played any number of times, with different parties making decisions on
the basis of their own ability to collect debt, and on their assessment of their particular
competitors’ abilities in each transaction. Since the parties know they differ in their debtcollection skills and their ability to influence the debtor, no agreement would be reached. For
well-resourced repeat-playing creditors, for whom the net expected returns from competing under
the individualistic regime are overwhelmingly likely to be higher than the net expected returns
from cooperating under a collective one, there is no rationally self-interested reason for
82
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participation in the latter. In respect of any given transaction, the same holds for creditors with a
connection with or influence over the debtor’s management.83 What is more, parties are merely
expressing preferences based on self-interest, and nothing in the CBM leads us to believe they
should not be allowed to alter their preferences from transaction to transaction. Not only will
agreement between unequal creditors not be reached in a particular transaction, then, it will never
be reached in the ex ante position to any transaction.84
Once again, this conclusion is hardly specific to those unfriendly to the CBM. Jackson
himself virtually concedes that a collective insolvency regime would only emerge from the
hypothetical bargain on the back of the false assumption that all of the “real-world” creditors are
“homogenous” in their debt collection and bargaining skills and that none has particular influence
with the debtor.85 Realising that this conclusion would render his model entirely hollow, Jackson
does then attempt to paddle away from it, providing what I reckon are three reasons for
suggesting that even for non-homogenous creditors, the individualistic regime would be
undesirable. First, he claims, continuation of the individualistic system would necessitate the
incurring of monitoring costs, and secondly, it would leave some residual uncertainty about the
creditors’ recoveries in particular transactions.
These attempts to salvage something for the CBM are obviously feeble.86 It simply is not
true that monitoring costs would impact equally upon repeat players (for example, institutional
lenders, some trade and even Crown creditors), who would enjoy economies of scale and
accumulated expertise in undertaking such monitoring, as they would upon one-off lenders (for
example, employee creditors, consumer pre-payers, some trade creditors, any tort claimants), who
would not have these advantages. And repeat players can deal with uncertainty by diversifying,
thereby (more than) making good what they lose in some races by winning others. This is
something one-off lenders cannot do. Again, Jackson concedes that “diversification is a response
to risk-aversion”; but he then attempts to qualify the concession by adding that “individualistic
remedies lead…to a collectively undesirable race”.87 This qualification is no more persuasive then
Jackson’s original argument. Within the CBM, well-diversified repeat players do not care about
what is “collectively undesirable”! They are motivated, let us recall, solely by their own selfinterest, and so appeals to the collective weal should not be regarded as holding any sway with
them. Nor would they be moved by the fact that the switch-over to a collective system is likely to
preserve the most value in the debtor’s estate. Self-interested repeat players would prefer a larger
slice of a smaller pie to a smaller slice of a larger pie. And while the collective regime would
usually lead to a larger pie, winning an individualistic race might lead to a larger slice.
It should be manifest, then, that repeat players simply do not need the comforts of the
automatic stay in anything like the way that one-off transactors do. The same holds for creditors
with influence over the debtor, for example, those connected with its managers or controlling
shareholders. It remains a mystery within the CBM construct, therefore, why repeat players, wellresourced creditors and those connected with the debtor would agree to the cancellation of their
83
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advantages under the individualistic regime, for the privilege of ranking on par in a collective
forum with those they would otherwise be highly likely to beat.
I said that Jackson comes up with three arguments in support of his suggestion that the
CBM’s hypothetical bargain might lead to the automatic stay even if it were to drop the false
assumption that all creditors in the real world are homogenous. Well, his third reason is as
follows. He asserts that “there would be distinct advantages to a legal rule that presumed equality
in the position of all creditors with similar legal entitlements, instead of delving into a case-bycase examination of factors such as ‘knowledge’ [of] or ‘friendliness’ [with the debtor].”88
Apparently, this is on the basis that it would be sensible for “a legal decision maker” to create
rules only roughly based on the particular attributes of various types of creditor, instead of trying
to accommodate the immense possible diversity of all the creditors in all the insolvency
proceedings a legal regime would be expected to regulate. On this basis, the automatic stay would
be a good practical response to the problems anticipated under the individualistic system.89 There
are several problems with this argument, of which I will mention two. Firstly, the switch to the
perspective of the “legal decision maker” indicates that we are beyond the realm of the CBM,
which of course is meant to focus on what creditors would prefer.90 And secondly and as a result,
the model here becomes entirely question-begging. Recall that the CBM is supposed to tell “legal
decision makers” what insolvency laws to enact by showing what creditors would prefer and
hence consent to. And it determines what creditors would prefer by asking what rules would be in
their respective self-interest. So unless it can say what would be in the self-interest of various
creditors, it can tell us nothing about what the content of insolvency law ought to be. Here, as we
have seen, the CBM cannot show why all creditors equally would find the collective regime
marked by the automatic stay to be in their respective interests. Some would, but others would
not. So even if Jackson is right that insolvency law should eschew enquiries into the
circumstances of particular creditors in particular insolvencies in order to impose just one rule on
all, he signally fails to show what that rule ought to be, or in other words, why it should be the
automatic stay rather than the free-for-all!
It follows, therefore, that the CBM can neither explain nor justify the automatic stay.
F. The Nature of Bargaining and Duggan’s Defence of the Creditors’ Bargain Model
So what does Duggan have to say about all this?91 His position is intriguing. While agreeing with
me that it is important to settle upon the correct interpretation of the CBM’s ex ante position,92 he
thinks that he has an answer. The ex ante position might, he says, be interpreted in one of two
ways:
“(1) in advance of any creditor lending to a particular debtor (Position 1), or (2) in
advance of the enactment of the insolvency laws (Position 2).”93
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Having apparently found significant textual support in the CBM scholarship for both Positions,
Duggan claims that the model’s progenitors “vacillate[] between Positions 1 and 2, apparently
without noticing the inconsistency.”94 He holds that while several of the arguments I level against
the CBM (some of them discussed above) are effective if the model’s ex ante position is
interpreted as in Position 1,95 the model might well be rescued if only it would adopt Position 2.96
I found that making sense of the distinction between Duggan’s two Positions calls for
heroic effort. There would appear to be only one sensible way of understanding the distinction.
While he does contrast the two Positions – indeed, while he suggests that there is an
“inconsistency” between them – Duggan should not, it seems to me, be taken to be suggesting
that Position 1 refers to a state of affairs which is not “in advance of the enactment of the
insolvency laws”. Consider the alternative: Since the two Positions are supposed to be different,
could it be sensible to understand Position 1 as the state of affairs in which the insolvency laws
had already been enacted by the time the CBM operated to ascertain the terms of the hypothetical
bargain? Besides being flatly contradicted by the writings of the CBM’s progenitors,97 that
suggestion would be absurd: What would the parties be supposed to be bargaining about in that
case, since, presumably, the collective regime would then already exist?98 It is surely a sine qua
non of any interpretation of the hypothetical bargain that it takes place in a state of affairs where
insolvency law is assumed to be absent. And in fact, as I have noted, it is clear beyond any doubt
– including from the two passages Duggan cites as exemplifying Jackson’s commitment to
Position 1 – that the hypothetical bargain is to be struck in advance of the enactment of a
“collective liquidation system”.99 The only coherent way of understanding Position 1, then, is to
take it as referring to a state of affairs where no lending has yet taken place, and where no
insolvency laws have yet been enacted.
This then suggests the only coherent understanding of Duggan’s Position 2, though, as
before, we really have to rely heavily on the principle of sympathy. Since Position 2 is supposed
to be different from and “inconsistent” with Position 1, that could only be because Position 2
refers to a state of affairs where some relevant creditor has already made a loan to some relevant
debtor. Of course this too is clearly contradicted by the CBM’s progenitors, who repeatedly insist
that the creditors are supposed to engage in the hypothetical bargaining “before extending
credit”.100 But in order to make any sense of what Duggan might have in mind, we have to go
along with him and ignore this part of what the CBM’s authors say. At least, doing so does not
94
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lead to absurdity in the way that doing the same with Position 1 would. In other words, then, the
two Positions mark two points on the temporal continuum relating to the prospective (Position 1)
and then actual (Position 2) making of a loan by a relevant creditor to a relevant debtor. Even on
this understanding, Position 2 is still, I suppose, an interpretation of the ‘ex ante’ position, since it
relates to a period before the creditors must have resort to the insolvency regime (and of course,
before any such regime has been enacted).101
It is one thing to make sense of the difference between the two Positions, and quite
another to understand why Duggan places such great weight on it. Given the only sensible
explication of the Positions I can find, it should be obvious why the CBM’s progenitors (ignoring
the fact that, at least implicitly, they reject Position 2) might appear to “vacillate” between them:
There is no analytically significant difference between the two Positions! What matters to the
CBM is that the hypothetical bargain be struck in a state in which no insolvency laws exist, and
that in this state, Real Parties in Natural Ignorance are consulted as to how they wish to be treated
in their debtor’s insolvency. But then the two Scenarios I have sketched out above demonstrate
that such hypothetical bargaining would not produce the automatic stay. What is more, the
analysis of both Scenarios, particularly of 1, clearly covers every variant of Positions 1 and 2,
holding equally for the incentives of different types of creditor before and after a loan might be
made. Indeed, since Position 2 involves the parties knowing more about themselves and each
other than Position 1, it is less conducive to the CBM, since it is less likely to allow any
agreement to be reached as between creditors aware of their relative positions in any
individualistic race.102
Further, Duggan displays once again at this point an apparent misunderstanding about the
nature of bargaining to which I have already drawn attention. The CBM can, he insists, predict
the automatic stay by employing Position 2:
“assume three creditors: C1, C2 and C2. C1 and C2 are both strong creditors (banks, nonbank lending institutions or the like) whereas C3 is a weak creditor (an employee, for
example, or a weak trade creditor, or a pre-paying consumer)…The alternative version of
the CBM [that is, one based on Duggan’s Position 2] predicts that C1, C2 and C3 would
all agree ex ante on a collective system. A collective system is in C1 and C2’s interests
given that neither of them knows the outcome of future individualistic races between
them and it is in C3’s interests because C3 will do better against C1 and C2 in a
collective system than it would in an individualistic race.”103
The attentive reader would not be surprised by what follows. First, in what way is this an
“alternative” version of the CBM, when (as noted above) all writing on that model explicitly
states and quite clearly enshrines the premise that the hypothetical bargain is to be, and must be,
concluded “in advance of the enactment of the insolvency laws”? Given Duggan’s concession
that the ‘standard’ version of the CBM cannot predict the collective regime marked by the
101
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automatic stay, and given that his “alternative” version is absolutely identical, Duggan would
appear to be in a bit of a pickle.
Secondly, assume that Duggan is right that C1 and C2 have reason to bargain with each
other, and assume also that C3 would be better off within than outside of the collective regime
and thus would wish to bargain with C1 and C2. But it must be remembered that, here, it takes
three to tango: Duggan overlooks the need to explain why C1 and C2 would wish to bargain with
C3! There is, quite simply, nothing they would gain by sharing with C3 the benefits of their
abstinence from racing as against each other. After all, C3 is hardly likely – “tomorrow” any
more than “today”104 – to transform from a struggling one-off transactor105 or inexperienced and
poorly resourced player lacking in bargaining power106 into a bank-beating debt collector! Since
C1 and C2 do not have any reason to fear competing against C3, then, they have no reason to
wish to co-operate with it either. So C3 is out, as is any suggestion of a collective regime marked
by an automatic stay equally applicable to all. Instead, in an hypothetical bargain as between
themselves, it would be in the respective self-interest of both C1 and C2 simply to agree not to
race against each other, thus controlling duplicative monitoring costs inter se, mitigating any risk
aversion, and if necessary to further their interests and their interests alone, preserve any going
concern surplus. They could do this in any of several ways. Here is one with empirical support in
the real world: Whichever of C1 and C2 lends first would monitor on behalf of them both.
Assume that this is C1. When C2 lends later, it would compel the debtor to authorise C1 to
release the results of its monitoring to C2. C1 would be rewarded for this monitoring either by
priority over C2 or with a higher interest rate or perhaps both.107 When the debtor becomes
insolvent, C1 and C2 would race (against other creditors, though not inter se) to collect on their
debts to the maximal degree, leaving C3 spluttering at the starting line.
Thirdly and even ignoring these points, are C1, C2 and C3 real creditors of exactly the
sort one would find in an actual, real-life insolvency, or are they rough approximations of the sort
of creditor one might expect to find in “the range” of insolvency cases?108 If the latter, then how
can their consent tell us anything about how the law ought to treat real creditors? How can
consent given by a rough approximation of me justify coercion against me? Fourth and finally,
even if C1, C2 and C3 are the sorts of creditors one would find in a particular real-life insolvency,
they have not in fact consented to the automatic stay. So how can consent that they might have
given but did not in fact give be held binding against them, any more than the consent I would
have given but did not give to the sale of my share portfolio when it was worth $100 justify
depriving me of that portfolio for that amount even though it is now worth many times as much?
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And finally and for completeness, how could consent that might have been given by a rough
approximation of me but in fact was not, possibly be held binding upon me?!
While the reader would of course make up her own mind, it seems to me that Duggan has
provided no response to any of these questions. His attempt to defend what he thinks is a new
version of the CBM must therefore be considered less than a success.
G. The Creditors’ Bargain and the Authentic Consent Model
I noted in the book that the stay on individual actions by unsecured creditors has been a part of
bankruptcy and insolvency law, as it were, from the day that there has been such a law. The
collective regime defined by the stay is the most central and unchallenged aspect of the process of
winding up companies. The stay on (in the UK) unsecured claims is a “provisional fixed point”,
then. That it should exist and be part of insolvency law is one of our “settled convictions” about
this area of the law.109 We feel confident, and can agree, that independent action by the unsecured
creditors of an insolvent person should be stayed, whether or not we agree on any other aspect of
the insolvency regime. Very persuasive reasons indeed would have to be produced to convince us
that the stay should no longer be part of insolvency law. Till such reasons are forthcoming, any
explanatory theory of the insolvency regime should be able to account for the stay. If it does not,
it can not claim to be an account of this regime.
Well, for the reasons we have just considered, we must condemn the CBM precisely
because it fails this test. The model’s predictions are either indeterminate, or more likely, it
predicts that there would be no automatic stay, creditors who enjoy systematic advantages under
the pre-insolvency regime being loath to give these up for the privilege of participating in the
collective system on par with weaker competitors.110
This has very consequential implications, which appear to have been missed by Duggan.
Since the CBM cannot predict, explain or justify the automatic stay – this defining aspect of the
collective insolvency system – it can explain no other feature which relies upon the collectivity of
insolvency law (for example, the pari passu principle111), or which protects or bolsters the
efficacy of that collectivity (for example, the wrongful trading provisions112 or insolvency law’s
rules for the adjustment of antecedent transactions113).
What is more, since I reached this conclusion at the end of the second chapter of my
book, it seems rather surprising for Duggan to have been left with the impression, a further seven
chapters and 280 pager later, that the book’s “main argument” is that “the ACM is different from,
and superior to, the CBM as a tool for positive and normative analysis of insolvency law.”114 This
is made doubly surprising in view of Duggan’s complaint that I do “not systematically compare
the two models at the level of application,” that I do not “always explain how the law would be
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different if the CBM was used instead”.115 Should the fact that I do not systematically compare
the two models not count as evidence that my “main argument” was not the one Duggan
attributes to me? What is more, I thought that by the end of the second chapter of my book, I had
explained exactly how the law would look if dictated by the CBM: Most likely, there would be no
collective insolvency regime at all! It follows also that since I could not, for the reasons above,
understand how the CBM, applied faithfully and in view of its central premises, could possibly
lead to the imposition of the collective regime (at least of the sort we have) in the first place, it
seemed to me both difficult and pointless to engage in the distortive logical gymnastics I
considered would be required to attempt to “apply” that model to particular features of the
collective regime. So I engaged in this process only when that was necessary in order to address
arguments extant in the literature which draw on the CBM, as about the wrongful trading
provisions.
And finally, Duggan’s repeated assertions that I surreptitiously “elide” the CBM with the
ACM, or that the two models “converge” at the “level of application”,116 could only be accepted
if it could be demonstrated that, as a first step, the CBM can predict and explain the collective
regime marked by the automatic stay. Unless that could be done – and I have outlined here the
main reasons for thinking that even if this could be done, it has not yet been – the CBM could
obviously not “converge” at any level with the ACM, which does, or so I have claimed, explain
the collective regime and the panoply of legal practices that support it.
IV. THE AUTHENTIC CONSENT MODEL AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The background to the ACM is the recognition of the CBM’s failure, and an appreciation of the
basic reasons for that failure. In attempting to understand and/or justify legal institutions:
“one cannot merely invoke the fact that under circumstances C agent A would prefer
option O. One must explain the propriety of describing the circumstances in a particular
way, of attributing particular characteristics and interests to the agents in the choice
position, and of giving them a particular menu of options. Perhaps this would take legal
writers too far into the muddles of moral philosophy. If so, it might be the better part of
valor to eschew appeal to arguments of this kind.”117
All that is true, and the warning is apt. But a principled analysis and justification of insolvency
law must still by sought.
A. The basics of the Authentic Consent Model
So the ACM sets off to avoid the faults of the CBM.118 Most importantly, the ACM is a
contractualist theory whereas the CBM is a contractarian one.119 The ACM therefore designs its
‘choice position’, in which the relevant parties are to be consulted on the selection of principles to
115
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govern them in the debtor’s distress, by reference to Dramatic Ignorance. This is based on the
premise that the choice of principles should not be influenced by morally irrelevant features and
considerations of the parties,120 for example, their gender, race, wealth, negotiating abilities,
bargaining power, influence over any other party, status as a particular type of creditor, position
in any/most/all individualistic races, etc. The ACM defends the characteristics it attributes to the
parties whose interests are to be governed by insolvency law by claiming that the legal and
political culture of society demands that when consulted on the design of institutions meant to
govern them, citizens be considered free (that is, capable of forming and revising a conception of
their own good), reasonable (that is, capable of being moved by considerations of fair reciprocity,
or in other words, of proposing and abiding by principles of fair co-operation on the assurance
that others would likewise do so), and thus equal. As equals, all relevant parties are entitled to
equal consideration of their interests in the design and implementation of insolvency law.
The ACM also stipulates that the parties should go about choosing such principles while
acting consistently with means/ends rationality. Note that rationality implies adherence to the
dictates of transaction cost efficiency: other things being equal, it is irrational to adopt a course of
action which consumes more resources than one which leaves more resources for the pursuit of
other valued goals.121 And in the choice position, the parties are assumed to be motivated by selfinterest. This means they seek rights of access to or influence over their distressed debtor’s assets.
Finally, the ACM decides on the menu of options to present to the parties in the choice
position by asking, “What makes insolvency law special?” Insolvency law must deal only with
peculiar insolvency issues. At the same time, it must give a voice to all those affected by such
issues.
B. Reciprocity and Self-interest
Duggan is perturbed that the ACM does not have any resources for “weighting self-interest
against reciprocity”, nor for determining “the policy outcome of any given weighting”.122 He
therefore questions whether the ACM could predict or explain the structure of the automatic stay,
unless it were surreptitiously to “blur the distinction between self-interest and reciprocity.”123 He
thinks that despite claiming to have drawn on Rawls’s work in setting up the ACM’s choice
position, I have missed the point that:
“Rawls does not suggest that parties in the original position are motivated by reciprocity.
They are motivated by self-interest. Reciprocity is simply a function of the limited
information available to the parties in the original position.”124
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This, however, is precisely how the ACM’s choice position also operates. Parties there do
not attempt to balance self-interest against reciprocity. Once in the choice position, parties are
assumed to be motivated by rational self-interest alone.125 It is the construction of the choice
position which ensures that the self-interest of each party would be channelled along the path
carved out by the demands of reciprocity.126 I took pains to explain and emphasise this point:
The ACM “operationalizes [reciprocity, as well and liberty, and thus, equality] by
requiring all principles to be selected from its ‘choice position’”.127
“Because of the construction of the choice position, parties must act reasonably [i.e. with
reciprocity].”128
Here, then, is how the ACM reconciles self-interest with reciprocity:
“Parties seek to further their self-interest in choosing the principles to govern insolvency
situations, but ‘The state of ignorance in the [choice] position is so shaped that the
antecedent interest of everyone must lie [] in the same solution.”129

Corporate Insolvency, 48; see also at 82, including footnote 88, and more generally, the use of what I
called the distinction between ‘individual-level’ and ‘institutional-level’ justifications. This aspect of my
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It should be clear, then, that the choice position does not require the parties to strike some
sort of balance between reciprocity and self-interest. In fact, reciprocity is ensured here even as
the parties go about making calculations of self-interest:
“Since the parties do not know who they will turn out to be once the state of Dramatic
Ignorance is removed, they must equally take into account the interests of all the actual
people they might find themselves to be.”130
C. The Automatic Stay
The automatic stay in corporate liquidation obviously affects the interests of all (in the UK,
unsecured131) creditors. In the ACM’s choice position, the parties would, firstly, recognise, for the
reasons described above, the desirability of minimising duplicative monitoring, dealing with risk
aversion, preserving any going concern surplus, and eliminating the need to strike real-life ex ante
bargains. These factors all argue in favour of the abandonment of the individualistic preinsolvency regime in favour of a collective one characterised by the automatic stay. This by itself
would not satisfy the parties in the choice position, however. They anticipate turning out to be, or
to have their interests represented by, systematically weak or systematically strong creditors, inter
alia. The parties must therefore satisfy themselves that the stay does not unduly disadvantage
either group.
Secondly, then, the stay seems to protect the interests of parties (especially one-off
transactors) who as a group simply would not have any chance of competing against repeat
players in the individualistic race, and (for non-consensual creditors or those in a weak bargaining
position) might have had little control over the terms of the loan. Further, certain creditors might
be vulnerable to serious harm if provided too small a return on their loan in their debtor’s
insolvency. Such creditors arguably deserve greater ex post protection in the insolvency forum
than creditors able to protect themselves ex ante, for example, through diversification. The parties
in the choice position accept, however, that such protection could be provided within the
collective regime marked by the automatic stay, for example, by according a higher priority to the
claims of such creditors.
Thirdly, the parties in the choice position know that the creditors worst affected by the
automatic stay (creditors who are not risk averse in any particular transaction because they are
repeat players, and those having insider knowledge of the company’s prospects, etc.) have the
ability to diversify, or to adjust interest rates and other terms of the loan to compensate for the
effects of the stay, or both. This assures them that such creditors would not suffer harm to their
vital interests if they are indeed subjected to the collective regime.
The automatic stay also affects the debtor’s shareholders, suspending any claims they
might have against the company. The parties in the choice position realise, however, that the
automatic stay is likely to maximise the value in the debtor’s estate for the reasons already
considered, and that this is in the shareholders’ interest as maximising the chance of their
receiving any potential surplus. In addition, parties in the choice position would also deduce that
130
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a collective liquidation regime minimises the uncertainty inherent in any individualistic postinsolvency regime about the creditors’ respective positions in the queue for the debtor’s assets.132
This would be reflected in the interest charged by adjusting creditors on their loans during the
company’s solvency. Since the company would have to pay less on financing its debts, more
would be available for disbursement to the shareholders. Realising this, each party in the choice
position would be willing to accept the automatic stay even though they might turn out to be (or
be represented by) a shareholder of the company rather than a creditor.
V. THE PARI PASSU PRINCIPLE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INSOLVENT
ESTATE
I have argued that significant confusion besets discussions of the pari passu principle in the
judgments of (at least English) courts and in academic commentary.133 It is essential to
distinguish three principles, all of which are sometimes referred to as the pari passu principle.
A. The Pari Passu Principle Identified
Firstly, there is the pari passu principle properly so called (‘the pari passu principle’).134 This
principle requires insolvency law to take claimants “exactly as it finds them”,135 such that the
distribution of assets within an insolvency forum is based on the pre-insolvency form of claims.
So for example, all those holding claims classified under pre-insolvency law as ‘unsecured’ ought
to be repaid the same proportion of their claims as all others similarly placed. On this
understanding of the pari passu principle, the existence of insolvency set-off and preferential
claims (among others) constitutes exceptions to this principle.
Secondly, sometimes the term ‘pari passu’ is also confusingly used to refer to pro rata
distribution within the various classes of claimant established by insolvency law itself (‘the
principle of ratable distribution within classes’).136 It should be clear why it would be extremely
confusing to describe this too as pari passu distribution: the ratable treatment of preferential
claims inter se constitutes the application of this principle, whereas the very existence of
preferential claims constitutes an exception to the pari passu principle, properly understood in the
first sense described above. It would be paradoxical – indeed, self-contradictory – to say that the
treatment of preferential claims is an application of, and yet the very existence of such claims is
an exception to, one and the same pari passu principle.
Thirdly, confusion is compounded when the term ‘pari passu’ is used to describe not just
one or both of the above situations, but also to refer to the automatic stay.137 While the two
132
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principles described in the previous two paragraphs are distributive (specifying how the value in
the insolvent estate is to be allocated amongst various claimants), the automatic stay does not
mandate distribution of any sort. It is in fact about the conservation of the insolvent estate,
striking down attempts to bypass the collective insolvency regime. The automatic stay is perfectly
compatible with any manner of distribution within a collective insolvency forum, be it pari passu,
or ratable distribution within classes set up by insolvency law itself, or indeed any other
distributive formula.
B. What the Principle Does and Does not Do
I have argued that the pari passu principle, disentangled from the principle of ratable distribution
within classes and from the automatic stay, is rather less important than it is sometimes made out
to be. Firstly, both empirical evidence138 and doctrinal arguments139 demonstrate that the principle
does not constitute an accurate description of how the assets of insolvent companies are in fact
distributed (here, the principle of ratable distribution within classes is more important). Second,
the principle has no role to play in ensuring an orderly winding-up of such companies (this is the
role of the automatic stay and other aspects of the collectivity of the insolvency regime). Thirdly,
the pari passu principle does not underlie, explain or justify distinctive features of the formal
insolvency regime, notably, its collectivity (which, as mentioned above, is about the conservation
of the insolvent estate, not about its distribution). Fourth, most of the (English) case law said to
support the pari passu principle actually supports the principle of ratable distribution within
classes, or the principles underlying or bolstering the automatic stay, or both. What such case law
does not support is the pari passu principle properly so called. Fifth and finally, in the
distribution of value from the insolvency estate, fairness more often demands the rejection than
the application of the principle. This is discussed in the following sub-section.
What, then, is the true role of the pari passu principle? I argued that it operates as a ‘fallback’ mechanism, which takes over when it would be pointless and thus wasteful to provide any
other distributive method. Insolvency law creates or tolerates particular distributive rules to
govern those types of claim that the policy of the law requires to be met to the extent possible (for
example, some claims held by employees, who enjoy a statutory preferential status, or those held
by certain secured creditors). But once this is done, nothing (or not much) would be left for
distribution to other creditors. Most insolvency proceedings (in England, 75% of them or more)
yield nothing for general unsecured creditors. And when they do bring some returns, the yields
are fairly small (about 7 pence on the pound on average in all proceedings). So there simply is no
point in deciding how these claims should rank vis-à-vis each other. For such claims to be
governed by the pari passu rule makes very good sense, since the costs in terms of time, effort,
and resources required to determine their appropriate (fair and efficient) rankings would far
exceed any benefits. For such a situation, in fact, the superficial equality of the pari passu
principle is ideal. In most instances, this simply means some types of creditor equally get nothing.
138
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In the remaining minority of insolvencies, the tiny amounts available for distribution are all
distributed proportionately, rather than being wasted in ascertaining the claimants’ correct
rankings. The pari passu principle applies, then, whenever the costs of providing for different
rankings for different claims would exceed the benefits.140 The claims it governs mostly — and
necessarily — constitute something approaching a distributively null set: they are held by those
who will receive nothing (or very little).
C. Insolvency Distribution to Vulnerable Creditors
Within the ACM, what sort of factors might justify according distributive priority to some types
of creditors over others? Duggan provides an excellent summary:141
“in terms of the ACM, equality does not mean formal equality but, rather, ‘a right to
equal concern and respect in the design and construction of institutions’. In the ACM[’s]
choice position, parties bargaining about the appropriate rule for the distribution of the
insolvent’s assets would not choose an across-the-board pari passu rule. Creditors are not
homogenous. For example, banks are well diversified (because they lend to many
debtors), good risk-bearers (because they can spread their losses from any given
insolvency [and, I would add, because they exercise very great control over the terms on
which they lend] and knowledgeable about the risks of lending (because they are repeat
players in the market for the provision of credit). The ACM’s assumption of Dramatic
Ignorance means that parties in the choice position do not know whether they would turn
out to be bank-creditors or employee-creditors and ‘so they accord equal concern to the
sets of interests associated with each. But this requires that those in a more vulnerable
position in their debtor’s insolvency be given greater protection than those better able to
deal with the loss. [Knowing that they could deal quite well with being paid back less on
any individual loan if they turned out to be represented in the real world by a bank, all]
the parties [might] agree to provide greater protection to employee-claimants, just in case
they find themselves vulnerable to great harm as one themselves.”
But what about the CBM? Duggan suggests that there are “at least two possible ways of
accounting for the preferential treatment of employee wage claims using the CBM model.”142 The
first, the contract-failure explanation, suggests that if able to negotiate costlessly and with
sufficient information, employees would bargain for a risk premium as part of their wage package
to cover the risk of non-payment in their employer’s insolvency. Crucially, it is “in the other
creditors’ interests to agree [to this premium], because ex ante they would worry that otherwise
employers might have trouble attracting labour.”143 The statutory preferential payment regime for
certain employee claims merely replicates the terms of this hypothetical bargain. On the second
view, the risk-shifting explanation, employees are worse risk bearers than other types of creditor
since they are unable to diversify, and since they might not have the resources, knowledge or
experience to monitor the debtor and to adjust the terms of their loans accordingly. In the ex ante
140
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bargain, therefore, employee-claims would be accorded a higher priority by all creditors as a way
of shifting insolvency risk from employees to other types of creditor, “because if other creditors
are superior risk-bearers the end result will be to reduce the size of the risk premium the debtor
has to pay.”144
None of this seems particularly convincing. Firstly and as discussed, the CBM’s
reasoning does not, for the reasons explained above, lead to the imposition of the collective
regime marked by the automatic stay at all. It thus cannot predict or explain, let alone justify,
special distributive rules to be applied within the collective forum. Each of the explanations just
summarised assumes to the contrary. Each must therefore be considered congenitally defective.
Second and even ignoring that, assume that creditors enjoying individualistic debt-enforcement
advantages, particularly systematic ones of the sort enjoyed by experienced repeat players or
those with influence over the debtor, could be persuaded to agree in some ex ante position to give
these up in return for participation rights in the collective procedure.145 Well, surely they would
only do so if given the assurance that the distributive rules applicable to them therein would
reflect their pre-insolvency advantages.146 It is difficult to understand why institutional lenders
and creditors connected with the debtor would not only not demand this preferential status, but
would go even further by accepting a position subordinate to those (like employees) with whom
they have no real need to bargain for a collective regime in the first place, and whom they would
systematically beat in all realistic enforcement scenarios governed by the general non-insolvency
law. This objection also applies equally to both explanations proffered by Duggan.147
Thirdly and particularly in relation to the contract-failure explanation, what creditors
could credibly demand in the ex ante negotiations depends, inter alia, on what the bargaining
theory literature refers to as their ‘outside options’ (roughly, what they would do if the bargain
were not to be struck).148 In the CBM, the outside option is the continuation of the individualistic
regime.149 If no bargain is struck with employee-creditors, therefore, it is not that employees
would cease being employees, thus causing employers to “have trouble attracting labour”. Rather,
they would continue being employees governed by the first-come, first-served general law.
Fourthly and related to this, it is utterly implausible that all types of employees would be able
credibly to threaten to withhold their labour unless promised a preferential position in their
employer’s insolvency.150 What would the outside option be, in particular, for employees
144
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providing more or less fungible services? Working for another employer? But there is no reason
to believe this employer’s other creditors (particularly repeat-paying ones and those having
influence over this employer) would have a different incentive set. Or going without work
altogether? But the more vulnerable the worker, the greater (presumably) his need for work, and
correspondingly, the less credible his threat to withhold services. Paradoxically, therefore, the
more vulnerable an employee and thus the greater the necessity for him that his interests be
protected within the collective forum, the less likely he would be within this alleged extension to
the CBM to be able to bargain for it.
Finally and taking the two explanations together, notice how each of them renders the
other untenable. Duggan observes that:
“The contract-failure explanation assumes that employees in real life are incapable of
bargaining for a risk premium. This may not be true of employees with union
representation and so the choice between the contract-failure explanation and the riskshifting explanation may turn on an empirical judgment about represented and
unrepresented employees’ bargaining power.”151
Take that sub-set of formal insolvency proceedings in which both represented employees (that is,
those able to bargain for a risk premium) and unrepresented ones (that is, those unable to charge a
risk premium) have a stake. In the real world, both types of creditor are accorded a statutory
preferential status. It should be clear from what Duggan says, however, that according to the
contract-failure explanation, represented employees ought not to be given a preferential status,
since they would already have charged a risk premium, and so would be overcompensated by the
statutory priority! Correspondingly, according to the risk-shifting explanation, unrepresented
employees should not be given a statutory preference, since to do so would be to violate the
rights, pursuant to the hypothetical ex ante agreement, of all other types of creditor!152 Given the
mutual inconsistency of these two explanations, it follows that it would be logically incoherent to
accept, at one and the same time, both of them. It follows also that anyone tempted to accept
either one of the two explanations would be unable to explain why both represented and
unrepresented employees are equally accorded a statutory preferential status. This shows that
neither of these alleged extensions to the CBM has the resources to explain the present contours
of the law.
VI. THE WRONGFUL TRADING PROVISIONS
A. The Objections to Redistribution
An important theme in the CBM literature pertains to the undesirability for insolvency law to be
‘redistributive’.153 Insolvency law is redistributive in the relevant sense if and to the extent to
which it alters the relative values of the pre-insolvency rights held by the various parties, most
obviously, by vesting new rights in some which they do not have under the general law. The
CBM’s progenitors argue that creditors would have struck their hypothetical bargain, in the way
outlined in section 3(a) above, only so as to deal with deployment issues, that is, those relating to
the best method for preserving and maximising the value in the distressed company’s estate.
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There is therefore no warrant for insolvency law to deal with distribution issues, that is, those
relating to the way in which this value is to be allocated amongst various types of claimants. It is
not simply the case, claim the CBM’s progenitors, that attempting to address distribution issues
would place insolvency law beyond the justificatory ambit of the CBM. Further and damagingly,
redistribution would create perverse incentives (in the terminology introduced in section 2(c)
above, motivation costs), for those who benefit from the redistribution inoptimally to rush the
debtor into the insolvency forum, and for those who would lose out under the redistribution
inoptimally to impede the initiation of insolvency proceedings.
I have argued that the wrongful trading provisions, to be found in section 214 of the UK
Insolvency Act 1986, are redistributive in the relevant sense.154 These provisions require the
managers of a company with no reasonable prospects of avoiding insolvent liquidation to take, on
pain of personal liability, every reasonable step to minimise further loss to the company’s
creditors. Their redistributive nature is obvious. Firstly, the insolvent firm’s general creditors are
given the benefit of a right, held and exercised in their favour by the liquidator, which does not
exist under non-insolvency law, and they gain access under that right to the personal assets of the
debtor company’s directors, which assets were immune to their claims before the debtor entered
the special insolvency forum. Secondly, the duty imposed by this section on directors is different
from any that exists under the general law, since it is terminal in nature, aimed not at the
continuation of the company in the medium to long term but with ensuring a value-maximising
end to its activities in the short to (very rarely) medium term. Thirdly, the wrongful trading
provisions actually upset the relative values of the rights of unsecured creditors on the one hand
and the debtor’s directors on the other. They protect the creditors from further loss beyond the
point where the debtor is irremediably distressed, but only by removing from the directors the
benefit of limited liability. Fourth and finally, these provisions are unconcerned with the relative
values inter se of the rights of unsecured creditors.
Having established that the wrongful trading provisions are redistributive in the relevant
sense, I went on to argue that they nevertheless do not create any perverse incentives.155 Firstly,
they do not encourage general creditors, the beneficiaries of the redistributive effect, to rush the
debtor into the insolvency forum with undue haste, since the quantum of the benefit they would
thus receive would be no more than the loss that they could be established to have suffered
because of the inappropriate response by the debtor’s directors to its irremediable distress.156 And
secondly, the debtor’s directors not only do not get an incentive to keep the debtor out of the
insolvency forum, they in fact acquire a reason to determine the optimal time at which the debtor
ought to be consigned to this forum, and then to put it there. If they do not, then their personal
assets are liable to being made available to general creditors to the extent to which the latter have
suffered loss resulting from the undue delay on the directors’ part.157
The fact that the wrongful trading provisions do not create incentives for strategic misuse
of the insolvency process despite being redistributive does not, in and of itself, lead to the
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conclusion that the CBM cannot explain these provisions.158 It is nevertheless clear that these
provisions fall beyond this model’s explanatory and justificatory ambit.159
B. Wrongful Trading and the Creditors’ Bargain
How might the CBM go about attempting to explain the section 214 duty? Here is one
suggestion.160 It might be said that some far-sighted creditors in some (perhaps all) real-life
transactions would realise ex ante, before lending anything, that doing so would give rise to
financial agency costs in case the debtor were later to become terminally distressed. In other
words, the debtor’s directors would strive to keep it out of the insolvency forum, hoping thereby
to keep their jobs, and at least formally, to preserve the shareholders’ equity interest. The
creditors would suffer as a result, however, since, ex hypothesi, no reasonable prospect would
remain at that point of the debtor avoiding insolvent liquidation. Attempts to stave off the
(practically) inevitable would therefore result in further loss of value to the creditors as a group.
Anticipating ex ante the existence of these agency problems, the creditors could contract for the
right to monitor the directors, and then incur costs in doing so. However, as long as creditors
anticipated the existence of these additional costs, they would take them into account in deciding
what to charge on their loans to the firm. So monitoring costs would be passed on to the firm, and
thus to its shareholders, its residual claimants. At the ex ante negotiations, therefore, shareholders
in their turn would find it cheaper to agree with creditors that in case the debtor were to become
terminally distressed, its directors should thenceforth be required to protect the interests of
creditors rather than those of shareholders. In other words, whether creditors would be required to
monitor directors, or directors would have to bond themselves to creditors, it would be the
shareholders who would bear the costs. And shareholders would prefer the sort of bonding
involved in the wrongful trading provisions over monitoring since that would be likely to be
cheaper in many circumstances. On this reasoning, then, a section 214-type duty would be
accepted by shareholders in a real-life ex ante bargain.
This argument does not succeed. Firstly, the wrongful trading provisions are meant to
ensure that hopelessly troubled companies enter the insolvency forum at the optimal time.161 This
forum enables and forces those interested in the company’s undertaking to forego aggressive and
value-destroying individual action. In other words, one of the functions of the collective
insolvency regime is to minimise the co-ordination costs of the creditors of a firm threatened with
insolvency. Section 214 is a tool enabling the regime to take over when these costs would be most
acute. However, the existence of the collective regime might itself create motivation costs by
producing incentives for parties who would lose out under it to try to prevent the company
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becoming subject to it. Directors would act for themselves (out of fear of losing their jobs upon
the initiation of liquidation) and on behalf of shareholders (who would formally lose their equity
interest when the company goes into insolvent liquidation) to keep the firm out of the insolvency
forum. Against this background, the main role of section 214 is to assist in overcoming the coordination costs of creditors by controlling creditor/manager agency costs on the eve of insolvent
liquidation. This shows why the CBM is unlikely to be able to account for this section: As already
explained, the most plausible prediction emerging from this model is that there would be no
switch-over from an individualistic to a collective regime. Since the wrongful trading provisions
are a means of buttressing the collective liquidation regime, therefore, they too cannot be
explained through the CBM.162
Secondly and even ignoring this fundamental problem, not all types of creditors who are
Real Parties in Natural Ignorance are able to anticipate the motivation costs of managers on the
eve of their firm’s insolvency. So for example, one-off transactors like employees (who are not in
the business of making loans, and therefore, of making loans to companies which become
insolvent) and some inexperienced trade creditors, might be in this position. Further and more
importantly, regardless of whether all creditors anticipate (or ought reasonably to anticipate) the
existence of this type of motivation costs, not all of them would be in a position, while
negotiating with creditors and shareholders in some ex ante position, to pass them on to the
debtor’s shareholders. Whether they could do so would depend on their bargaining power vis-àvis that of the shareholders, and there is no reason to think that this would always be such as to
ensure that all or most of the monitoring costs were borne by shareholders. What is more, to the
extent that some creditors are non-adjusting and do not take monitoring costs into account when
deciding what to charge a particular debtor (the Crown, for example), the same holds for them as
well. Finally, the very types of creditor most likely to be on the wrong side of a disparity of
bargaining power between them and shareholders (again, for example, employees and some trade
creditors) are also likely to be intrinsically poor monitors, ill-equipped to gather or demand
information about the debtor’s activities, and unable to respond to any such information in any
case (e.g. by bringing pressure to bear on the debtor’s management sufficient to make it desist
from misbehaviour).
Taken together, these observations lead to the conclusion that some types of creditor, by
threatening to pass on relatively higher monitoring costs to shareholders, would be able to get
agreement from them to relatively lower-cost bonds against eve-of-insolvency misbehaviour on
the management’s part. But these bonds would not be general, seeking to protect the interests of
all creditors. Instead, they would be specific, aimed at protecting from misbehaviour only those
creditors who could otherwise load on to shareholders the costs of monitoring the debtor.163 So
this line of argument provides no reason for thinking that the inclusive section 214 duty, which
seeks to encourage managers of a firm on the brink of insolvency to take every (reasonable) step
to minimise harm to all of the firm’s creditors – seeks, in other words, to subordinate the interests
of the debtor’s managers and shareholders to the interests of all creditors, not just those able to
load monitoring costs onto shareholders – would be acceptable to the debtor’s shareholders. It
therefore provides no justification for that duty.
C. Justifying the Wrongful Trading Provisions
For the reasons outlined above, the ACM does predict and justify the collective regime marked by
the automatic stay. We can therefore ask if it can also help us analyse the wrongful trading
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provisions, which aim to ensure that the collective regime would take over at the right point in
time during the debtor’s terminal distress.
In the ACM’s choice position and having been placed in Dramatic Ignorance, the parties
do not know whether they would turn out to be the shareholders, the creditors, or the directors of
the firm on the brink of insolvency. So they must equally take into account the interests of all
these parties. To start with, and even knowing that some of them would turn out to be the debtor’s
shareholders, all the parties would conclude that, once there remained no reasonable prospect of
the firm avoiding insolvent liquidation, directors’ efforts, on the shareholders’ behalf, to strive
unreasonably to reverse the firm’s fortunes would be harmful to them all, taken as a group, in the
ways described above. Being rational, they would seek to minimise these motivation costs, and
for the same reason, would seek to do so in the cheapest way possible. It has already been noted
that it would generally be less expensive to seek bonds against misbehaviour from managers than
to monitor them directly.164 Parties bargaining in the choice position know, however, that in the
real world, some of them would not be able to anticipate the need to monitor, and in addition,
may not be able to get the shareholders’ approval to directors giving those bonds (for the reasons
already discussed). This would be unacceptable to the bargaining parties for two reasons. First, to
the extent that monitoring is more expensive than bonding, it would be irrational to tolerate the
possibility that some creditors – unable to compel shareholders to agree to the directors providing
such bonds – would have to monitor nevertheless. Parties in the choice position would wish to
avoid these deadweight costs. And second, parties would seek to be protected against directors’
misbehaviour even if they turned out to be the sort of creditors not only unable to compel
shareholders to allow directors to offer bonds to them, but also unable efficaciously to monitor
directors themselves.
For both these reasons, it would be acceptable to all the parties treated as equals for an
inclusive bond in the creditors’ favour to be extracted from the directors. In the choice position,
each party would have an equal incentive to provide that, on the eve of insolvent liquidation, the
firm’s managers should be required to switch allegiances, coming under obligations to act so as to
prevent harm to all of the firm’s creditors as a group. This, I argued, provides justification for the
section 214 duty.
VII. CONCLUSION
If and to the extent to which the foregoing arguments are valid, Duggan fails to inject plausibility
into the Creditors’ Bargain Model. The CBM is at best indeterminate, providing no specific point
in time at which to ascertain the creditors’ self-interest, no reason to think that creditors should be
taken to have consented to rules and principles that reflect their self-interest at any particular
point, and no basis for concluding that the essential collectivity of insolvency law is equally in the
interests of all types of creditor. What is more, the CBM mistakenly assumes Kaldor-Hicks, or
perhaps Pareto, efficiency to be normative ideals by which to judge insolvency law, when in fact
each of these versions of efficiency is unattainable in practice, question-begging because
susceptible to wealth effects, and normatively defective. Duggan’s own suggestion, that the CBM
can be rescued by taking its ex ante position as referring to a time at which no insolvency laws
have been enacted, provides no solution to any of these fundamental problems. What is more, this
suggestion leaves mysterious what Duggan takes to be the alternative: how could the ex ante
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position be based on anything but the assumption that no insolvency law exists at the time that the
hypothetical bargain is to be struck?
A better approach, it was argued, is to recognise the distinction between substantive and
procedural legal goals, and to reject both Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks as incapable of serving as
either type of goal. Insolvency law is best conceptualised as having as its substantive goal the
provision of a fair scheme of co-operation as equals amongst all those affected by peculiar
insolvency issues. Its main procedural goal is the pursuit of transaction cost efficiency, which
aims to minimise the sum of co-ordination and motivation costs. The Authentic Consent Model,
which enshrines these premises, successfully explains and justifies not only the collectivity of the
insolvency law, but also the nature and proper place of the pari passu principle and the UK
wrongful trading provisions.

- 41 -

